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SUMMARY 
 
The Brazilian electric sector has two market-environments for the energy supply: a regulated pool 
(ACR), with 64 power distribution companies, and the free market (ACL), including free-consumers 
and energy wholesalers. In the regulated market, the power generation competition is enforced via 
energy auctions, where the winning generator has to sign long-term standard power purchase 
agreements (PPA) simultaneously with all distributors at the bidding-price. In this work we use the 
Real Options Theory to valuate new hydraulic generation assets, which will be traded in the new 
energy auction. This approach models the uncertainties in setting up the cash flow for the investments 
and incorporates some possible managerial flexibility associated with the decision taken along the 
investment forecast. A real example is presented, in which we incorporated the flexibilities regarding 
the waiting to invest in a new hydro power plant and an abandon option, representing the transfer of 
concession rights. Since the project involves a multistage investment consisting of design, construction 
and operation phases, it can be treated as a sequential compound option. A binomial approach was 
elaborated to model this investment opportunity analysis. 
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1. Introduction 
The current Brazilian electrical sector regulation is based on centralized planning that aims at 
attracting the private capital investments needed for power generation expansion consistent with the 
characteristics and singularities of the country. The main goals of the current regulation are to 
guarantee the required power generation expansion, to promote reasonable tariffs at the lowest feasible 
cost, and to integrate social goals into the sector through an electric energy universalization program  
The Brazilian electric sector has two market-environments for the energy supply: a regulated pool 
(ACR), with 64 power distribution companies, and the free market (ACL), including free-consumers 
and energy commercializers. In the regulated market, the power generation competition is enforced via 
energy auctions, where the winning generator has to sign long-term standard power purchase 
agreements (PPA) simultaneously with all distributors at the bidding-price.  
In the Brazilian electric system, about 90% of the electric power generation (91 GW) is hydraulic. 
They exploit a large, complex and highly integrated system that provides energy at low prices for long 
time periods, but that it is very vulnerable to water inflow uncertainty. The PPA signed at the new 
auction, complies with the energy availability modality, doesn’t present any hydraulic risk to the 
generators. The costs of the hydrological risk are undertaken by the buyers, which guarantee their 
relaying to the final consumer [1]. 
Due to its importance for creation of value for the shareholders, the investment decision has always 
been of academic and managerial interest. With the discounted cash flow method (DCF), introduced in 
the 1950’s, the value of a project is determined by discounting the future expected cash flows at a 
discount rate that takes into account the risk of the project. However, despite its advantages over the 
payback method, both methods have a static nature implying that, once the firm commits itself to a 
project, the project’s outcome will be unaffected by future decisions, thereby ignoring any managerial 
flexibility the project may have. This management flexibility has value, and represents the real options 
associated with the project [2]. The real options approach to valuation and investment decision-making 
quantifies the effects of risk, identifies opportunities to accelerate, modify or abandon projects. In the 
volatile but extremely high potential new economy scenario, understanding the option value is 
absolutely critical. 
Interesting papers which treats on Brazilian generation investments could be found in [3]-[5]. 
In this work we use the Real Options Theory to valuate new hydraulic generation assets, which will be 
traded in the new energy auction. This approach models the uncertainties in setting up the cash flow 
for the investments and incorporates some possible managerial flexibility associated with the decision 
taken along the investment forecast. A real example is presented, in which we incorporated the 
flexibilities regarding the waiting to invest in a new hydro power plant and an abandon option, 
representing the transfer of concession rights. Since the project involves a multistage investment 
consisting of design, construction and operation phases, it can be treated as a sequential compound 
option. A binomial approach was elaborated to model this investment opportunity analysis. 
2. The Brazilian Electricity Market 
Since 1997, the Brazilian government has attempted to introduce competition in the Brazilian 
electricity sector. Nevertheless, the Law 10848 enacted in 2004 created some drawbacks in this 
process. It established two market environments: a regulated and a free environment. The agents can 
freely establish bilateral contracts of buying or selling electricity under the free environment (ACL). 
The only constraint is related to the consumer that needs to have a load above 3 MW. The previous 
legislation supported these contracts and a schedule was proposed to alleviate the load constraint. The 
completion of the schedule would occur in 2006 when only a free market would exist with the spot 
market and the bilateral contracts. The new law created the regulated environment (ACR) where all 
distributors are obliged to participate. The generators and distributors make the contracts following the 
guidelines of the Brazilian Energy  Commercialization Agency (CCEE), a kind of clearing house with 
additional power, which is under the government rules. These contracts result from an auction 
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conducted by the Brazilian Regulatory Agency (ANEEL). The distributors need to previously inform 
their electricity demand to ANEEL for the coming five years. With this data, the Ministry of Mines 
and Energy (MME) established the amount of energy to be bought for the next few years. The time 
span of the contracts varies from 5 to 20 years and it is established before each auction. The longer 
contract period is devoted to new generation plants in order to stimulate increments in generation 
capacity.  
Therefore, the generation agents can choose if they want to sell energy to distributors or directly to 
consumers. The problem is that the energy transacted in the regulated environment represents almost 
90 % of the total demand. Moreover, the long-term contract assured by the distributors after the 
auction process means that the risks of over or under capacity are transferred to the consumers. In 
other words, the consumers buy the capacity, not the energy. 
For existing generators, i.e., agents who already have generation assets, they can choose selling their 
energy: 
• to the free consumer and establish the bilateral contract by setting quantity and price; 
• to the distributors participating in the government auctions and accepting the conditions of the 
standard contracts (usually with a maximum period of 8 years); or 
• on the spot market. 
For agents who are planning to invest in new power plants, there are also three options: 
• participate in the government auction selling the energy to the distributors. In this case, the 
contracts are standard and usually are for a period up to 20 years.  
• try to find a consumer to buy their energy in a long-term condition 
• sell their energy on the spot market 
There are at least two rounds of auctions each year: one for the existing energy and another for the 
new energy. For the existing energy the contracts are made starting from the next year and with a 
period no longer than 8 years. The total energy involved is usually related to the expired contracts or 
new loads, which were not covered by the long-term contracts. The prices are guided by the current 
prices of the spot market and therefore the option of selling to the spot market may be relevant.  
For the new energy, there are basically two kinds of contracts or two kinds of products: the one whose 
delivery starts five years ahead with a contracted period of 15 to 20 years (A–5) and other whose 
delivery starts three years ahead with the same contracted period (A–3). The amount of energy 
negotiated in A–3 represents an adjustment of the A–5 in order to match the demand. For instance, in 
this year (2006) there would be a round of auctions for A–5 contracts in which delivery starts in 2011. 
There would also be a round of auctions for A–3 contracts whose delivery starts in 2009. In the latter 
case, the negotiated amount captures the difference between the load predicted for the year 2009 two 
years ago (2004), and the energy contracted in the auctions for A–5 that took place also in 2004.  
The creation of these types of contracts and the correlated government auctions was a response to the 
late rationing that took place in 2001. Thus, the main objective was to establish a more secured 
environment for the generation investors based on long-term contracts.  
Although the government contracts represent a guaranty against electricity price fluctuations, there are 
still a lot of uncertainties that the generation agents need to deal with. Besides the common causes that 
affect the investment, like interest rates, construction costs, equipment costs, labor costs, there is one 
that has caused many headaches to the generation investors, namely the environmental regulation, 
which is crucial especially for hydro plant projects. Many hydro projects have stalled because of 
environmental problems. Government is trying to overcome them by incorporating a previous 
environmental license in each new possible generation plant.  
3. Hydro-Power Plant Investment Analysis 
Given the aforementioned environment, this paper will deal with the new energy, i.e., the long-term 
contracts which trigger the investments in new generating power plants. For the sake of simplicity, the 
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proposed model will be described in parallel with an example. A real hydro-plant case will be 
presented and the main data are: 
 Installed Power = 120 MW; 
 Assured Energy = 66 MW; 
 Building Investment Cost = 4 R$/MWh; 
 Generation O&M Cost = 7.25 R$/MWh; 
 Average Energy Price = 114.23 R$/MWh; 
 Working Capital = R$1 million; 
 Charge Rate = 5% of Gross Income; 
 Tax Rate = 35%;  
 Depreciation Rate = 4%;  
 Discount Rate = 14%. 
This new hydraulic generation asset will be traded in the new energy auction. The calculation of the 
average price of energy and the average investment cost shown in Table I was made based on the 
results of the first new energy auction (www.ccee.org.br ). 
Table I. New Energy Auction Results 
 
 Contracted Energy 
(avg. MW) 
Time 
(hour) 
Energy 
(MWh) 
Price 
(R$/MWh) 
2008-2037 71 262992 8.672.432 106.95 
2009-2038 46 262968 12.096.528 113.89 
2010-2039 871 262968 234.304.488 114.83 
Total Suply (MW) 1008 Average Energy Price (R$/MWh) 114.23 
     
 
Assured Energy 
(avg. MW) Investiment (R$) 
Investment Cost 
R$ million/avg.MW 
Price 
(R$/MWh) 
Cemig G&T 27,268     165.755.650,80                   6..08                   115.10  
Eletrosul 39     267.595.880,00                   6.86                   112.55 
Furnas 252,13   1.836.545.843,00                   7.28                   115.17 
Orteng 38,5      262.417.880,00                   6.82                   114.86 
Alusa 71,4      490.018.590,00                   6.86                   111.41 
NeoEnergia 40,902      248.633.476,20                   6.08                   115.10 
Total 469,2          6.971.371,10                   6.66                    
 
The hydro plant project will cost immediately R$1 million for environmental studies, which will take a 
year to complete. At the end of that year, the firm could invest R$5 million to complete the design 
stage. A simulation was made using the average energy price, R$ 114.23 per MWh, and the average 
investment cost derived in the last auction, R$ 6.66 million per average MW. With an assured energy 
of 66 MW, an investment of 6.66 x 66 = R$ 439 million is necessary, being 10 % down, and 45 % in 
the next two years. The IRR found without consider any financial leverage is 8.49%, so, there is 
no incentive in building this new plant based on the energy prices derived in the last auction.  
A sensitivity analysis was made, using the average energy price, R$ 114,23 per MWh, and a discount 
rate of 14% [6], much more attractive, in order to calculate the minimum price and the highest 
possible investment cost, which, based on this data, the investment becomes viable. The 
minimum price found is R$186.29 and the highest possible investment cost is R$3.93 million 
per average MW. In our base case we use an investment cost of R$4 million per average MW.  
Since the project involves a multistage investment, it can be treated as a sequential compound option: 
a R$1 million investment creates the right to invest R$5 million in one year, and the exercise of that 
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choice creates the option to invest R$264 million to build the plant or the option to abandon the 
project, representing the transfer of concession rights that worth, we suppose, the gross income of a 
year, above R$66 million. 
The investment analysis regarding this plant will be made in four steps that are usually followed when 
real options are incorporated into a binomial model [7], namely: 
 Calculation of the present value with no flexibility, using the traditional discounted cash-flow 
(DCF) method; 
 Building of an event tree, based on the set of combined uncertainties that drive the volatility of the 
project. The event tree models the set of values that may be taken through time by the underlying 
risk asset;  
 Incorporation of the flexibilities, by building a decision tree. The decision tree shows the payoffs 
from optimal decisions, conditional on the state of nature. Therefore, its payoffs are those that 
would result from the option that is being valuated; 
 Calculation of the real option value, by valuating the payoffs in the decision tree by means of risk-
neutral probabilities; 
3.1. Traditional Investment Analysis 
Modeling the asset value involves elaborating an event tree, which shows the possible future values of 
the plant under plausible market scenarios [8]. Therefore it is necessary to estimate the value that the 
plant would have if it existed today, supposing it were immediately operational, using traditional 
valuation techniques, such as the discounted cash flow presented in Table II and Figure 1. 
Table II. Traditional Investment Analysis R$ 
Year Gross Income Costs EBITDA Depreciation EBIT Taxes Free Cash Flow
0 (1.000.000)
1 (5.000.000)
2 (25.400.000)
3 (118.800.000)
4 (118.800.000)
5 To 27 66.044.738 7.493.897 47.990.841 10.560.000 47.467.795 16.796.795 41.754.047 
28 To 33 66.044.738 7.493.897 58.550.841 47.467.795 20.492.795 38.058.047 
34 66.044.738 7.493.897 59.550.841 0 58.550.841 20.492.795 39.058.047 
PV = (R$ 1.787.356)  Don’t Invest 
NPV = (R$ 2.787.355) ∑PV Operation CF= 172.668.838 ∑PV Invest CF= (175.456.193)
IRR = 13.78 %  < Discount Rate  
Free Cash Flow of the Investment
(130.000.000)
(110.000.000)
(90.000.000)
(70.000.000)
(50.000.000)
(30.000.000)
(10.000.000)
10.000.000
30.000.000
50.000.000
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R
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Figure 1. Investment Free Cash Flow 
3.2. Monte Carlo Analysis for Project Uncertainty Determination 
The Crystal Ball program was used to make the Monte Carlo simulation necessary to estimate the 
percent variation of standard deviation from project present value along the years, named, the project’s 
volatility [9]. This project return rate is, calculated by 
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In the Crystal Ball program, using the spreadsheet for cash-flow calculation, the uncertainty variable 
correspondent to the energy price was defined as Crystal Ball assumption, using a normal 
distribution, with mean 114.23 and standard deviation of 0.33, shown in Figure 2-a.  
 
 
Figure 2.  (a) Monte Carlo Simulation Assumption Definition for Energy Price Uncertainty 
(b) Project Return Rate resulted from Monte Carlo Simulation 
The spreadsheet cell containing the Z value was defined as the simulation forecast. During Monte 
Carlo simulation, the Z value distribution is obtained keeping constant the 0PV value and leaving 
1PV  and 1CF varying according to the uncertainties introduced as assumptions. So,  






−
+
=
73.355,787,1
ln 11
CFPV
Z                                         
A simulation was made with five thousand trials, whose result is shown in Figure 2-b. The standard 
deviation value of the rate of return on the project is 31 %. 
3.3. The Event Tree 
The calculated uncertainty is applied in making an event tree. The event tree models the set of values 
that the asset subject to risk may assume along the time. The equations from binomial model used for 
the event tree are: 
N
yt =∆                                                          (4) 
teu ∆= σ                                                       (5) 
ued t /1== ∆−σ                                          (6) 
where: 
y=option expiration time in years 
N=quantity of tree steps 
r=interest rate per year (continue capitalization) 
σ= project volatility  
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b= dividends rate 
p = rising movement probability 
u = growth rate of rising 
d = Reduction rate asset-object  
This tree may be constructed by a very simple and practical procedure. Initially the present value of 
the asset is introduced in step 0.  The other elements of the first line are calculated multiplying the 
previous element by u . Each remaining element is obtained multiplying the element from previous 
column at the previous line by d . The constructed event tree is shown in Table III. 
  First Option Second Option  Intermediate Calculations 
Tree Steps Quantity  4     t∆ = 1,0000 
Option Expiration Time (years)  1 3   u = 1,3634 
Project Volatility  31%    d = 0,7334 
Project PV  R$172.668.837    p = 52,13% 
Risk Free Rate  6,00%   
Dividends Rate  0,00%   
Exercise Price  R$5.000.000 R$ 254.232.000  
Initial Investment  R$1.000.000    
* R254.232.000 is the Investment Present Value in the year 3 corrected by 14%: 26.400.000/1,14-2+118.800.000 /1,14-1+118.800.000 /1,14 
Table III. Event Tree 
Step 0 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 
172.668.837  235.421.029  320.978.944  437.630.753  596.676.760  
  126.643.433  172.668.837  235.421.029  320.978.944  
    92.886.241  126.643.433  172.668.837  
      68.127.130  92.886.241  
        49.967.636  
The tree shows the evolution of the plant values at each stage of the project’s life. In the traditional 
valuation, we calculated that if the hydro plant existed today, its operation present value would be 
172.668.837. With a sigma of 31%, the up and down factors are 1.3634 and 0.7334, respectively. In the 
first year the plant will be worth either 235.421.029 or 126.643.433 and at the end of the fourth year it 
will range from 49.967.636 to 596.676.760. 
3.4. The Decision Tree 
For the mentioned example, starting from a backward analysis on decision tree, it is possible to valuate 
the option to construct the plant. The valuation begins in the last tree columns. Therefore, in the last 
period the option value is calculated as follows: 
[ ]0;S - X MaxV =                                   (8) 
where V = Real Option Value, S = Event tree PV and X = price to exercise the option. 
Table IV. Second Investment Option (construction phase) valuation Tree 
Step 0 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 
33.769.648 61.803.793 111.553.071 197.789.244 342.444.760 
  7.805.460 15.961.590 32.640.272 66.746.944 
    0 0 0 
      0 0 
        0 
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That is to say, when the project present value (S) calculated onto event tree is higher than the invested 
value (X), that is, the exercise price, the option should be exercised and its price will be S – X. 
Otherwise, the option should not be exercised, and its value is zero. For example 
V = Max[596.676.760 - 254.232.000  ; 0] = 342.444.760 
Each previous step is evaluated using the replicating portfolio method to estimate the value of the 
project if it were kept alive. For example  
m 596.676.760 + (1+rf)B = 342.444.760 
m 320.978.944 + (1+rf)B = 66.746.944 
m = (342.444.760 - 66.746.944)  
       (596.676.760  - 320.978.944) 
B = (66.746.944- m * 320.978.944) / (1 + rf) 
B = (66.746.944- m * 320.978.944) / (1 + 0.06) 
 
Portfolio = m * 437.630.753  + b = 197.789.244  
Where: 
 
[ ]PortfolioS - X MaxV ;= = 197.789.244      
V = Max[437.630.753 - 254.232.000  , 197.789.244] 
m = number of units of the underlying asset in the portfolio 
b = Quantity of portfolio risk-free bonds 
We used the second option valuation tree as input to valuate the options to invest R$5 million to 
complete the plant design, an American call option, or the transfer of concession rights, a European 
put option. 
V = Max[61.803.793 - 5.000.000,00;66.000.000 – 5.000.000 - 61.803.793; 0] = 56.803.793 
Table V. First Option (invest R$5 million design phase) valuation Tree 
Step 0 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 
51.948.508 56.803.793 111.553.071 197.789.244 342.444.760 
  53.194.540 15.961.590 32.640.272 66.746.944 
    0 0 0 
      0 0 
        0 
 
The right to invest R$5 million in a year’s time is also determined by using the replication portfolio 
technique for either 56.803.793 or 53.194.540, resulting 51.948.508, which constitutes 50.948.508 
more than the R$1 million initial cost of the project. This contrasts with the net present value of minus 
2.787.355 calculated with no flexibility, using the traditional discounted cash-flow method. 
The decision tree shows the optimal strategies to be applied to the investment forecasting. 
Table VII. Project Decision Tree 
Step 0 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 
Invest R$1 mi Invest R$5 mi wait wait Invest R$254 mi 
  Transfer Rights wait wait Invest R$254 mi 
    wait wait Don’t Invest 
      wait  Don’t Invest 
        Don’t Invest 
4. Conclusion 
This paper presents a methodology to analyze the opportunity of new investment in electric generation 
considering the new market framework established by the Law 10884/04. The introduction of buying 
auctions conducted by the government to guarantee long-term contracts may be interpreted as a means 
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of diminishing the generation risks but also a new limitation for the free market. The decision making 
was treated in this paper incorporating the real option valuation under this new environment.  
The investment opportunity for a small power plant was analyzed throughout the paper emphasizing 
the usefulness of the methodology. The binomial approach was used to model the real option because 
of the inclusion of combined options into the analysis. The use of stochastic dynamic programming 
[10] in this particular case with combined options would bring more complexity to the problem 
without considerable gain. The advantage of the binomial approach is that it enables us to solve a 
much wider range of problems than the Black&Sholes [11] formula, which can be used to value 
financial options, but it is not appropriate for real options, because it requires a very restrictive set of 
assumptions that do not usually hold for project valuation. 
In this particular example, with an assured energy of 66 MW and a capacity of 120 MW, it was proved 
that there is no incentive in building this new plant based on the energy prices derived in the last 
auction, R$ 114.23 per MWh. The reasonable price should be above R$186.29 per MWh without 
considering the managerial flexibilities. According to the traditional analysis of the base case, with 
energy price of R$114.23, 14% of discount rate and a building investment cost of R$4 millions per 
avg.MW, the investment must be rejected due to its NPV of minus R$2.787.355. Considering all 
the flexibilities available in the market such as transferring the concession, selling the energy to the 
free market, etc. the calculated NPV is R$50.948.508 due to the aggregated value of the options.   
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